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1 Introduction 
Overseas employment workers play an important role in Philippines economy. Nearly ten per-
cent of gross domestic product (“GDP”) is contributed by overseas workers remittances1. The 
department of labor and employment (“DOLE”) and the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (“POEA”) are two of the agencies set out to protect the rights of Philippines 
overseas workers.  
According to the POEA 2010-2014 statistic report, over 400,000 Filipino seafarers work 
on-board ocean-going vessels. Because of the relatively high standard of training and language 
skills of the Filipinos, they are the most hired workers in today’s shipping industry in terms of 
number2. Due to the lack of commonly accepted judicial standards in place, however, there 
exists many areas of conflict between the Filipino workers and their foreign employers. In 
spite of the government’s attempts to improve the relations between the seafarers and their 
employers and, to bring equality and fairness into the contractual relation, more and more Fili-
pino seafarers file petitions against shipowners seeking to obtain compensation and benefits.  
“Contracts are legally enforceable agreements which represent a vehicle for planned ex-
changes3.” There are three kinds of seafarers’ contracts that apply to Filipino crews, namely 
the individual employment contract, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Stand-
ard Employment Contract (hereinafter POEA SEC) and Collective Bargaining Agreement4 
(hereinafter CBA or Collective Agreement). Individual employment contract states the terms 
and condition pertaining to the particular contracted employee’s ranking, wage and employ-
ment period5. POEA SEC and CBA regulate the general employment terms and condition, 
including obligations, minimum wage and working hours6.  
                                                
 
1 International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No.13/102, page 43 
2 Ellis, N., Sampson, H., The global labour market for seafarers working aboard merchant cargo ships, 2013, 
p14 
3 Jill Poole, Contract Law (UK: Oxford, 2012), p.1 
4 CBA is the contract negotiated between labor union and the employer. The most common CBA for Filipino 
crew is AMOSUP (Associated Marine Officers and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines) CBA negotiated between 
AMOSUP and employers 
5 International Transport Workers’ Federation, “ITF agreement,” http://www.itfseafarers.org/itf_agreements.cfm 
6 Ibid 
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  According to Philippine Labor Code Art 18, Filipino workers cannot be directly hired 
by foreign employers. It is the reason all Philippine overseas workers must have a valid signa-
tory POEA SEC in order to work on foreign-flagged vessels. If a seafarer is a member of a 
labor union and covered by a valid CBA, the CBA will be the supplement to POEA SEC. 
Most of the claims and disputes by far arise from issues regarding compensation and 
benefits, which is regulated in POEA SEC SECTION 20. As IG P&I Club recorded7, in No-
vember 2009, there were 23 cases with a total value of USD 1.2 million US concerning such 
issues recorded. By February 2011, additional 18 cases were recorded, making the total value 
more than USD 2.5 million. By February 2012, there were 59 cases with a value in excess of 
USD 4 million. By September 2013, there were a total 98 cases with a value of more than 
USD 6.2 million.  
It is a necessity that issues regarding work-related injury, illness or even death on board 
vessels be addressed in the terms of the contract. While the mechanism of compensation and 
benefits are detailed in the negotiated contract8 agreed by parties. Disputes are often solved by 
petitions filed by the employees who try to interpret the terms differently from the custom 
usage and seek for a chance of unjust enrichment9, rather than by the binding rules of the con-
tract.  
But, “It is not the seafarers who to blame for he present situation; but the current legal 
system which an increasing number of claimant lawyers, with diverse backgrounds, are able to 
exploit their personal gain.”10 While the there is a loophole in the “final and executory” nature 
of the decision from National Labour Relations Commission (hereinafter NLRC), the National 
Conciliation and Mediation Board (hereinafter NCMB) makes a “Prejudice caused to ship-
owner employers.” 11  
Also NLRC/NCMB, court of appeal and even the Supreme Court sometime set the clear 
evidence aside and made decisions in favor of the labors in some cases. From P&I comment, 
                                                
 
7 IG Personal Injury Subcommittee, International Group position paper on Garnishment, 03 October 2013 
8 POEA SEC Section 20. Compensation and Benefits 
9 IG Personal Injury Subcommittee, International Group position paper on Garnishment, 03 October 2013 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
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“To some shipowners the frustration is so immense that they consider changing crew national-
ities away from Filipinos12”  
1.1 Structure and scope 
This study will look into the problems described above in the introduction both on the legal 
aspect and through a practical approach. In this context, the study has the following scope:  
(1) Examine the grounds to interpret POEA SEC terms.  
(2) Assess in which ways the judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in Philippines are interpreting 
POEA SEC 
When it comes to the legal aspect of the problem, the first issue with which this thesis 
will deal concerns the analysis of the applicable law and the interpretation of POEA standard 
terms and conditions governing the overseas employment of Filipino seafarers on-board 
ocean-going ships through the lens of the Philippine law. Secondly, there will be a presenta-
tion on the decisions given by quasi-judicial and judicial bodies concerning the topic of the 
study. Thirdly, it will be necessary to draw attention to the dispute settlement procedure. In 
this part, there will be a look into the implications to the shipping industry and the economy of 
Philippine resulted from increasing conflicts and associated cases. Lastly, the critical assess-
ment of the court’s decisions will take place, followed by thoughts and comments on resolu-
tions of the current situation for Filipino workers who are important to the shipping industry. 
1.2 Methodology 
The main sources for this paper are the POEA SEC, Philippines Constitution, Philippines Civil 
Code, Philippines Labour Code, and decisions from Philippines legal system. Taking into ac-
count, that an accurate interpretation of Philippines law is important to access the right way to 
interpret the POEA SEC. 
Other sources include articles from P&I clubs and commentary from shipping industry. It 
their considerations regarding the issue are important, because this is a practical issue relating 
the shipping industry, manning agency and P&I clubs.  
                                                
 
12 Gard P&I news 209, 16 January 2013, http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/20734098/crew-claims-in-the-
philippines-when-the-contract-is-not-enough  
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2 POEA standard terms and conditions governing the overseas 
employment of Filipino seafarers on-board ocean-going ships 
2.1 General principle of contract 
2.1.1 Rules of interpretation 
Under English law, the terms and condition expressed in the contract is deemed to be final and 
binding, no matter what the true intention of parties before making the contract is. Under 
Norwegian law, not only the final binding contract per se, but the background and intention of 
parties during negotiate and make contract should also be take into consideration.  
It could be found out from the Philippine Civil Code that Philippine law is more like 
the spirit to exam the contract under Norwegian law. According to Philippine Law, if the 
terms of the contract are so obscure that it is impossible to ascertain the intention of the parties, 
then the agreement must be null and void13. Moreover, if the terms of the contract are clear 
enough, these terms shall prevail over the intention of the parties. Only if the wording of the 
agreement casts doubt upon the real intention of the parties, should this intention must govern 
the interpretation of the contract14. 
A contract reflects a mutual agreement between the parties. That is to say, every party 
has duties and rights according to the contracts. As it is stated on the Philippine Civil Code, a 
contract is binding upon the parties and it is not allowed for one of them to disregard the terms 
and conditions of the contract15.  
Along with this, a contract must be always performed bearing in mind the usage and 
the good faith among the parties. The Philippine Civil Code also follows this reasoning16.  
                                                
 
13 Philippine Civil Code, Title II Contracts, Chapter 5 Interpretation of Contract, Article 1378 
14 Ibid, Article 1370 
15 Ibid, Chapter 1 General Provisions, Article 1308 
16 Ibid, Article 1315 
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2.1.2 Rules of applicable law 
Follow Section 31. , The applicable law in connection with the contract is the law of 
the Republic of the Philippines, international convention, treaties and covenants that sign by 
the Philippines. Nevertheless, the main obligation and rights of the parties entering into con-
tractual agreements are regulated in the POEA SEC. Only if there is a loophole or ambiguous 
interpretation in the contract, Philippine law is the supplementary tool to make up the defi-
ciency. Conversely, if there is no ambiguity in the terms of the contract, then the latter should 
be binding upon the parties and these terms should be the only rules governing the legal rela-
tionship between the parties. 
Because of the nature of seafarer’s contracts, they are not considered as regular em-
ployment defined under the Labor Code17. In the case Pentagon International Shipping, Inc. vs. 
William B. Adelantar 18, the Supreme Court clearly stated that seafarer is a contractual em-
ployee. Another case the Supreme Court stated “the employer might re-hiring a seafarer due to 
practical considerations namely, his experience and qualification. However, this does not alter 
the status of his employment from being contractual.”19 
Though in the next year, the Labor Arbitrator (hereinafter LA) in the case Roberto 
Ravago vs. Esso Eastern Marine, Ltd. and Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.20, alleged sea-
farer is a regular employee because he is repeatedly contracted. But the Supreme Court denied 
this opinion and emphasized that seafarer is contractual employee. His rights and obligation 
are regulated in the contract terms and conditions on a per contract basis. 
The next chapter addresses the rules of interpretation involving contracts applied to 
POEA SEC. the interpretation given to this contract by the Supreme Court is compared therein 
with the general rules on interpreting contracts. 
                                                
 
17 Article 280. Regular and casual employment. 
18 Pentagon International Shipping, Inc. vs. William B. Adelantar, G.R. No. 157373, July 27, 2004 
19 Marcial Gu-Miro, vs. Rolando C. Adorable and Bergesen D.Y. Manila, G.R. No. 160952. August 20, 2004 
20 Roberto Ravago vs. Esso Eastern Marine, Ltd. and Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 158324. 
March 14, 2005 
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2.2 Issue regarding the interpretation of the POEA SEC 
2.2.1 Interpretation of section 20 Compensation and benefits 
2.2.1.1 Assessing if the illness is compensable 
Under POEA SEC Section 20 (Compensation and Benefits), the employer is liable to compen-
sate the seafarer who gets work-related injury, illness or death during the term of the contract21. 
The two prerequisites for compensation are: 1) that the event must happen within the period of 
contract and, 2) must be work-related.  
The employment period can be found in Section 2 (Commencement/ Duration of Con-
tract) and Section 18 (Termination of Employment). The commencement of the contract is 
from the time when the contracted seafarer actually departs from Philippine, either airport or 
seaport, for employment, and the termination of the contract is at the time when the seafarer is 
repatriated from ship and actually arrives at the place of hire. This reflects the practice of the 
industry. The same principle can also be found in the R.O.C.22 Exemplar of Fixed Term Em-
ployment Contract for Employing Seafarers Article 523. 
“The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual ba-
sis.”24 As it mentioned above, the seafarer is a contractual worker for providing his skill for a 
fix period of time. In practice, he usually repeatedly contracts to the same employer but this 
fact doesn’t make him fall in the scope of normal employer under Labor Law.  
Continuous or overtime work will make the employee fatigue. Thus the contract not 
only regulated the hours of working25 on board, which is in accordance with the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
                                                
 
21 In the event of cardio-vascular (Section 32A 11) and cerebro-vascular (Section 32A 12), followed within 24 
hours after termination of contract is still in the compensable scope. 
22 Republic of China (Taiwan) 
23 “The effective date is the first day that Party B (employee) serves on board when the vessel is within the terri-
tory of the R.O.C; however, the effective date will be the day that the vessel leaves a port for other countries. The 
termination of the contract depends on the time Party B arrives in Republic of China.” 
24 Marcial Gu-Miro, vs. Rolando C. Adorable and Bergesen D.Y. Manila, G.R. No. 160952, August 20, 2004 
25 POEA SEC Section 10 Hours of Work 
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(“STCW”), but also each period of employment cannot exceed 12 months, which is in accord-
ance with Marine Labour Convention 200626(hereinafter MLC convention). 
For the seafarers mental and physical health, they need a break after “long periods 
away from home, limited communication and consistently high work loads.”27 The rest period 
could be from days to months between each contract under different circumstances.  
What is the time lapse for a contract to be considered continuous or independent? Tak-
ing into account that there is usually only few months rest between contracts, due to the short 
break between contracts, in the long run, most contracts would seem to have a continuous na-
ture. 
In the case Gilbert Quizora, vs Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc.28, the 
seafarer was continuously hired for 9 years covering 7 contracts, all of the medical examina-
tion before every contract shows fit for duty, and there was always sign-off period in between. 
The Supreme Court ruled that a rehired seafarer’s illness is not equivalent to his getting ill 
during employment, considering the possibility that the seafarer acquired his illness during 
one of his sign-off period. Also in another case Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, et al. vs. 
Henry M. Simbajon 29, the Supreme Court ruled that a seafarer was hired by the same company 
for 3 years that he could acquired his illness, at some other time when he was not on board. 
But only few months after the later case, another opposite opinion presented in the case 
Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte. Ltd. vs. 
Juanito G. Bengson 30, the Supreme Court opined that the seafarer work for the same continu-
ous for 12 years, the working nature must took a toll on the seafarer’s body, thus he could not 
contracted his illness elsewhere but during the employment. 
As it was stated above, MLC convention prescribes that the seafarer has the right to be 
repatriated within a contract period of less than 12 months. The purpose of this rule is to pro-
                                                
 
26 Title 2: Condition of employment, Title 2 Regulation2.5 Repatriation, Standard A2.5 – Repatriation, (b) the 
maximum duration of service periods on board following which a seafarer is entitled to repatriation - such peri-
ods to be less than 12 months 
27 Andy Smith, “Adequate Crewing and Seafarers’ Fatigue: The International Perspective”p.5, January 2007  
28 Gilbert Quizora, vs Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No. 185412. November 16, 2011 
29 Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, et al. vs. Henry M. Simbajon, G.R. No. 203472. July 9, 2014, page 8 in the 
transcript 
30 Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte. Ltd. vs. Juanito G. Beng-
son, G.R. No. 198528. October 13, 2014, page 9 in the transcript 
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tect the mental and physical health of the seafarer. In line with this, the POEA SEC also pro-
vides the contract period should not exceed 12 months. This standard contract prescribes that 
within 12 months the contract can be extended provided that there was a mutual agreement 
between the seafarer and the employer. However, in practice, usually this period is extended 
beyond 12 months. 
Along with this, this mutual agreement can be express or tacit. In the case Inter-Orient 
Maritime, Inc. and/or Tankoil Carriers, Ltd. vs. Cristina Candava 31, a seafarer was hired for a 
9 months contract from January 2002 to 28 October the same year. On the expiration, the em-
ployer could not find a replacement crew for him thus he extended work until February 2003. 
The Supreme Court ruled that  
“there was an implied renewal of Joselito’s(seafarer’s) contract of employment 
for another 9 months starting from the expiration of the allowable three month 
extension on January 28,2003…”32  
the maximum allowable period of service is 12 month under POEA SEC, thus the period after 
12 month is deemed as a new contract. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the fact that this mutual agreement is express or tacit, if a 
seafarer keeps working for the same employer for a period longer than 12 months any subse-
quent working period that exceeds this period of time is to be considered another contract. 
From the Gilbert Quizora, vs Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc. case, it is pos-
sible to infer that the Supreme Court considers that in spite of short breaks between the end of 
a contractual relationship and the beginning of another one due to a subsequent rehiring a giv-
en illness acquired during this short break is to be considered stemming from one single work 
period. Since the activities behind such illness were carried out on behalf of the same employ-
er. 
Conversely, in the Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Manage-
ment (Asia) Pte. Ltd. vs. Juanito G. Bengson case, the Supreme Court ruled that due to the 
continuous work previously performed by the seafarer, he could not have contracted the illness 
elsewhere, implying that such an ailment had to be work-related. Notwithstanding, there was a 
                                                
 
31 Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc. and/or Tankoil Carriers, Ltd. vs. Cristina Candava, G.R. No. 201251. June 26, 2013, 
page 7 in the transcript 
32 Ibid 
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break in the contractual relationship. Therefore, there is room to infer that it is possible that the 
cause for the seafarer to become ill could be connected to something other than his work activ-
ities. Thus, arguably the grounds that the Supreme Court used in the Gilbert Quizora, vs 
Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc. case could also be applied to the Magsaysay 
Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte. Ltd. vs. Juanito G. 
Bengson case.  
The reason for this is that although a long period of employment could be a strong basis 
to affirm that the illness was acquired within that contract period, provided there is a connec-
tion between the work performed and such an ailment, if there is a break, in any case, the dis-
ease could have another source. 
Only work-related injury, illness or death as a result of work-related injury or illness is 
compensable. A work-related injury must be arising out of and in the course of employment33. 
The work-related illness is defined as those occupational diseases listed in Section 32A (Oc-
cupational Diseases) with conditions therein satisfied and determined by the company-
designated doctor, but it should not be pre-existing before process the contract. Section 20A 4, 
provided that even if the illnesses are not in the list are disputably presumed as work-related. 
2.2.1.2 Who decides if the illness is work-related? 
It is the company-designated physician who determines whether the illness is work-
related or not, however, the contracted seafarer, if not satisfied with the result, still has the 
right of choice to find his own doctor for a medical examination. If there is a conflict between 
the seafarer assigned doctor and company-designated physician, the solution is given in Sec-
tion 20A 3 paragraph 4, the seafarer and the employer can joint agree to ask for a third doc-
tor’s opinion, and this third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding. 
In spite of this section of the contract prescribing that “the third doctor’s opinion is final 
and binding” sometimes as it can be found in the case, the court upheld the opinion of seafarer 
appoint doctor, because according to the court the company-designated doctor is “self-
serving…. for the company” and discard the assessment of the company-designated doctor. 
Nevertheless, the allegation that one doctor is favoring one party can also be said regarding the 
                                                
 
33 POEA SEC Definition of Terms 17 
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seafarer appointed doctor. Precisely because of this, the contract prescribes the third doctor’s 
opinion rule. 
Sometimes as it can be found in the case German Marine Agencies, Inc. and Lubeca 
Marine Management HK Ltd. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Froilan S. De 
Lara34, the court not only upheld the opinion for the doctor who actually conducted the sur-
gery as finally and binding but also due to disagreement chose to set aside the third doctor 
opinion rule. Therefore, there seems to be also room to question if the opinion of the surgeon 
is in fact favoring the seafarer or not. The purpose of the third opinion rule is to clarify any 
doubt regarding to the situation of the seafarer, and by doing so, avoid potential disputes. 
Along with this, according to the court the consent to doctor’s opinion can be both ex-
plicit and tacit, as it can be found in the same case, since the company did not formally appoint 
a doctor but still the doctor was paid by the company. 
From the case above, it could be assumed that the court criterion to uphold of a doctor is 
based on the task that doctor performed the treatment to the seafarer. In some cases, a doctor 
would only do an assessment of the presumed work-related illness or disability. In others, a 
doctor will conduct the treatment. In the latter cases, the court finds that their opinion should 
be binding and final. Nonetheless, as it can be found in the case Santiago vs. Pacbasin Ship-
management, Inc.35, the court choses to uphold the opinion of the doctor who made the initial 
assessment not the treatment. Thus, it seems that the difference between the doctor who made 
the treatment and the one who perform the assessment cannot be used as a criterion also. 
As it mentioned above, according to the contract, if there is conflict between the compa-
ny-designated physician and the seafarer’s doctor. A third doctor can be agreed and appointed 
by both parties and the third doctor’s opinion shall be final and binding.  
When the company-designated doctor make the assessment, the risk to prove that the as-
sessment is wrong shift to the seafarer. It is only when the seafarer is not satisfied with the 
company doctor’s assessment, he will seek for another doctor’s opinion. The employer will 
not know the existence of another assessment before the seafarer raise the issue.  
                                                
 
34 German Marine Agencies, Inc. and Lubeca Marine Management HK Ltd. vs. National Labor Relations Com-
mission and Froilan S. De Lara, G.R. No. 142049, January 30, 2001 
35 Alen Santiago vs. Pacbasin Shipmanagement, Inc. and/or Majestic Carriers, Inc.,G.R. No. 194677. April 18, 
2012 
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The circumstances in the case Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. (now known as 
BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc.), et al. vs. Eulogio V. Dumadag 36, described this 
issue. The Supreme Court ruled that it is the seafarer’s duty to secure the opinion of a third 
doctor. The reason was also given from the Supreme Court stated that:  
“The petitioners (employer) could not have possibly caused the non-referral to 
a third doctor because they were not aware that Dumadag(seafarer) secured 
separate independent opinions regarding his disability.” 37 
Since the seafarer is the only person who knows there is a different opinion 
from his doctor against the assessment from the company-designated doctor, it is 
the seafarer’s duty to get a consensus regarding his medical assessment. 
2.2.1.3 On the work-related injury assessment time bar 
There is a time bar for the seafarer to establish the injury and illness is work-related or 
the right to claim the benefits will forfeit. The seafarer must go to company-designated doctor 
for a post-employment medical examination within three working days after his repatriation. 
Thus the burden to prove it is work-related falls on the seafarer. In the case Jebsens Maritime 
Inc., represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or Alliance Marine Services, Lld., vs. Enrique 
Undag 38, the Supreme Court ruled that a health certificate got two months after the seafarer’s 
repatriation cannot prove the illness is work-related. According to the court the reason to 
maintain the three days time bar is as follows: 
“Within three days from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician 
to determine if the illness was work-related or not. After that period, there 
would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the illness. To ignore the 
rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open 
the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability bene-
fits.”39 
One exception is also described in the same paragraph, if the seafarer is so ill and weak 
that he could not submit himself to the company-designated physician a written notice must 
be deliver to the agency in the same period.  
                                                
 
36 Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. (now known as BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc.), et al. vs. 
Eulogio V. Dumadag, G.R. No. 194362. June 26, 2013, page 9 in the transcript 
37 Ibid 
38 Jebsens Maritime Inc., represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or Alliance Marine Services, Lld., vs. Enrique 
Undag , G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 
39 Ibid 
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There are two case decisions concerning this issue. In the case Wallem Maritime Ser-
vices, Inc., and Wallem Ship Management, Ltd., vs. National Labor Relations Commission 
and Elizabeth Inductivo 40, the Supreme Court stated, 
“Indeed, for a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical atten-
tion one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and 
avail of the required medical examination”.  
In another case Crew and Ship Management International Inc. and Salena, Inc. vs. Jina T. 
Soria 41, the seafarer failed to comply the three day mandatory report procedure but the Su-
preme Court untied him from the rule due to he had physical infirmity. 
From these cases, it is possible to infer that the three days time bar is not an absolute 
rule to the court, but a relative one. Precisely because if the seafarer is severely ill, this time 
bar limit can be extended. This exception applies even in above cases where the seafarers did 
not even request the post-employment exam before or after repatriation. Therefore, arguably 
there are some sections of the POEA SEC that are not to be interpreted as applicable whatever 
the circumstances, but taking into account the situations. As in the case Jebsens Maritime Inc., 
represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or Alliance Marine Services, Lld., vs. Enrique 
Undag 42, the court ruled that two month was exceeding a reasonable time for establishing the 
connection between the illness and the work activity. Notwithstanding, in this case, the sea-
farer was not found severely ill. Hence, there might be room to affirm that two month may be 
an acceptable time limit where a seafarer was severely ill depending on the circumstances. In 
a Concurring Opinion, of the case Interorient Maritime Enteprises, Inc. vs. Victor M. Creer, 
III 43, judge J. Leonen stated that  
“In my view, the legal and contractual limitation of the exception to the man-
datory post-employment examination to instances where the seafarer is ‘physi-
cally incapacitated to do so’ will be contrary to the constitutional requirement 
for protection to labor and the priority that the state should grant to health.” 
                                                
 
40 Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., and Wallem Ship Management, Ltd., vs. National Labor Relations Commis-
sion and Elizabeth Inductivo, G.R. No. 130772. November 19, 1999 
41 Crew and Ship Management International Inc. and Salena, Inc. vs. Jina T. Soria, G.R. No. 175491. December 
10, 2012, 
42 Jebsens Maritime Inc., represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or Alliance Marine Services, Lld., vs. Enrique 
Undag, G.R. No. 191491. December 14, 2011,  
43 Interorient Maritime Enteprises, Inc. vs. Victor M. Creer, III, G.R. No. 181921. September 17, 2014, page 5 in 
the concurring opinion 
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Therefore, all the terms of the contract should be interpreted in a way as not 
to infringe the other rights of the seafarers. 
It would be inappropriate to draw the conclusion that the relaxation of the three days 
time bar rule would affect the competitively of the Filipino seafarers. In the words of the 
judge mentioned above: 
“Some may argue that the relaxation of the three-day rule will reduce the 
competitiveness of Filipino seafarers. I do not believe so. The competitiveness 
of our seafarers is attributed to their skills, creativity, and resiliency. Competi-
tiveness has very little to do with the mandatory three-day post-employment 
medical examination period.”44 
Another different question arose: “what if the employer refuse the seafarer’s request for 
post-employment exam?” In the case Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., Interorient En-
terprises, Inc. and Liberia and Dorothea Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. Leonora S. Remo45, the sea-
farer requested a post-employment exam but the employer never arranged him to undertake 
any assessment by company-designated doctor, thus he failed to comply the three days man-
datory report procedure and then turned to a self-serving doctor for treatment. The Supreme 
Court denied that the seafarer lost his right to claim and stated: 
“… the absence of a post-employment medical examination cannot be used to 
defeat respondents(seafarers) claim since the failure to subject the seafarer to 
this requirement was not due to the seafarers fault but to the inadvertence or 
deliberate refusal of petitioners(employers).”46 
This decision makes it clear that for the court what matters is if the seafarer requested 
the post-employment exam. Thus the seafarer would be discharged from his obligation the 
moment he did so request the mentioned exam. From that moment on, the seafarer is still enti-
tled to the right to claim. Moreover, this is clearly an example of a shift of the risk in the con-
tractual relationship. It is for the seafarer to request an exam but on the other hand it is for the 
employer to provide this service. 
                                                
 
44 Ibid, page 6 
45 Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., Interorient Enterprises, Inc. and Liberia and Dorothea Shipping Co., Ltd. 
vs. Leonora S. Remo, G.R. No. 181112, June 29, 2010, 
46 Ibid 
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2.2.1.4 Regarding the payment of sickness and disability allowance 
In the case of work-related injury or illness, the employer is liable for the full wage, 
while the seafarer is still on board, and the cost of medical treatment in foreign ports. When 
the seafarer need to be repatriated from the ship and receive further medical treatment on land, 
the employer has to bear the cost of repatriation and treatment, and the seafarer is entitled to 
an additional sickness allowance.  
The amount of sickness allowance is the basic wage of the seafarer, computes the days 
counting from the day he signed off from the ship until the time he is declared fit to work or 
disability grading, provided in section 32(Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries 
Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted), assessed by the 
company-designated physician. This sickness allowance period should not exceed 120 days 
and not less than a month. During this period the seafarer is deemed as “temporary total disa-
bility”. There is no difference degree assessment of temporary total disability. This “temporary 
total disability” period does not indicate that the seafarer has actual body irreparable damage. 
The true meaning is that the seafarer cannot work in this maximum 120 days period due to 
work-related illness or injury. It is nothing to do with the further assessment about disability 
grading either. If the illness or injury is later found out not work-related, the sickness allow-
ance is payable until the company-designated doctor make this assessment.  
In the situation concerning that the medical reason causes the seafarer repatriate that la-
ter be found out is non work-related. The company is liable for the sickness allowance, once 
the seafarer is repatriated for medical reason, at the time when he is under treatment and wait-
ing for the company-designated doctor to decide if the injury or illness is work-related. The 
supported Supreme Court decision could be found in the case Transocean Ship Management 
(Phils.), Inc., Carlos S. Salinas, and General Marine services Corporation vs. Inocencio Ve-
dad; Inocencio Vedad vs. Trancencio Ship Management (Phils.), Inc., Carlos S. Salinas, and 
General Marine Services Corporation47.  
If the seafarer is declared fit for duty after the medical treatment, the sickness allowance 
is the only benefit he could get. If the seafarer is further assessed disability grad due to irrepa-
                                                
 
47 Transocean Ship Management (Phils.), Inc., Carlos S. Salinas, and General Marine services Corporation vs. 
Inocencio Vedad; Inocencio Vedad vs. Trancencio Ship Management (Phils.), Inc., Carlos S. Salinas, and Gen-
eral Marine Services Corporation. G.R. Nos. 194490-91;G.R. Nos. 194518 & 194524, March 20, 2013 
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rable physical damage, he could receive the said sickness allowance plus a disability allow-
ance depends on different grad as compensation. 
The company-designated physician should assess the grading of disability solely base on 
the disability schedule provided under section 32. The number of days the seafarer under 
treatment or the number of days the sickness allowance is paid shall not be taken into consid-
eration.  
Since the seafarer is entitled sickness allowance and disability allowance, if a disability 
grad assessment is applicable under section 32, no loss of earning is compensable. In the case 
Power Shipping Enterprises Inc. et.al. vs. NLRC, et.al48, the court of appeal ruled that grant 
the loss of earning “would be repugnant to the rule of double recovery”49. The latter rule 
means that if a seafarer received a certain amount due to impairment, he cannot receive an-
other kind of compensation for the same cause. 
2.2.1.5 Grounds for receiving compensation 
There are the two condition that will forfeit the seafarer’s right of compensation which 
stated in Section 20 D and E. One is that the seafarer causes the injury, incapacity, disability or 
death by his willful, criminal act or intentional breach of his duties and the burden of proof 
falls on the employer. Another condition is if the seafarer knowingly concealed that the illness 
is pre-existing before the contract.  
In the case NLRC OFW CASE NO. (M) 03-07-1801-0050, a seafarer’s widow filed a 
claim for death benefits of her husband died on board due to fight with another seafarer. Both 
the LA and NRLC ruled that the cause of death was not work-related thus it is not qualified for 
the compensation and benefits under Section 20, because that the death due to deliberate acts 
during the contract period is nevertheless not compensable. Also in the cases Maritime Fac-
tors Inc., vs. Bienvenido R. Hindang and Crewlink vs. Teringtering51, that the death due to the 
seafarer committed suicide is not compensable. 
                                                
 
48 Power Shipping Enterprises Inc. et.al. vs. NLRC, et.al., CA-GR SP No. 75052, February 27, 2004 
49 Ibid 
50 NLRC OFW CASE NO. (M) 03-07-1801-00, March 20, 2006 
51 Maritime Factors Inc., vs. Bienvenido R. Hindang, G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011; Crewlink vs. Tering-
tering, G.R. No. 166803, October 14, 2012 
 16 
The compensation and benefits under POEA SEC are separated from the benefits un-
der Philippine laws such as Social Security System, Overseas Workers Welfare Administra-
tion, Employees’ Compensation Commission, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation and 
Home Development Mutual Fund, stated in Section 20A 7.  
In respect of the claims arising from the contract the time bar is three years from the 
date the cause of action arises. 
2.2.1.6 Defining pre-existing illness 
Before processing the contract, if the seafarer has an illness or physical condition, which was 
given medical advice or treatment. The illness shall be considered as pre-existing. If an illness 
or physical condition cannot be found by pre-employment medical examination (hereinafter 
PEME), but the seafarer has known and intentionally failed to disclose such condition. It shall 
also be considered as pre-existing.  
Every seafarer has to undertake a PEME every time before he enters into a new con-
tract. He should take the PEME no more than two months before he joins on board, and the 
PEME certificate will be considered valid for 2 years52. The PEME is not a thorough body 
exam, but just a basic assessment to see if a person fits for sea work duty. Every country has 
their own medical examination form, and the check-up items are not exactly the same. A sea-
farer has to undertake those items listed on both his home country’s medical examination form 
and the medical form of the vessel’s flag state that he is going to provide service for. No mat-
ter what, the all exam result must be in normal condition or meet the minimum requirement 
for the seafarer to perform the work onboard. Take a deck officer for example, whose eye vi-
sion is not perfect without corrected, who can reach the requirement 20/20 for both eyes after 
correction, he is considered fit for duty. But his blood pressure must be within the normal 
range at the time he is measured in the approved PEME clinic. Hence, a declared fit for duty 
PEME is only a certificate to show that the seafarer is competent for sea duty instead of his 
true physical condition. It is supported by the Supreme Court in the case NYK-FIL Ship Man-
                                                
 
52 UK P&I Club, “PEME FAQ” 
http://www.ukpandi.com/loss-prevention/peme/peme-faq/  
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agement, Inc. and/or NYK Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernandez53, 
stated that:  
“While a PEME may reveal enough for petitioners to decide whether a sea-
farer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform peti-
tioners of a seafarers true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged 
respondents illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory.”54 
2.2.1.7 Section 32 schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffer and diseases 
including occupational diseases or illness contracted 
This section is the basis to determine the disability grad and the amount of disability allow-
ance. There are 14 impediment grads (from 1 to 14) and the most serious is grad 1. A total 136 
injuries result in 14 parts of human body is listed and each item is given to a correspondent 
grad. For example: “Lower extremities, Loss of both feet at ankle joint or above” is classified 
under grad 1. In the note of this section states that any item classified under grad 1 is also 
called “total and permanent disability” (sometime abbreviate to “total permanent disability” or 
“permanent disability” in the judicial decisions). Thus in comparison of total permanent disa-
bility, other disability grad from 2 to 14 is called “partial permanent disability”. 
As it could be found in present cases Gilbert Quizora, vs. Denholm Crew Management 
(Philippines), Inc. and Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, et al. vs. Henry M. Simbajon55, that 
seafarers claim for the disability benefit when their employer refused to renew their contracts 
or rehire them. In these cases the Supreme Court denied that non-rehiring is indicative of disa-
bility. 
A totally different decision, the seafarer was unemployed for three years “is an eloquent 
proof of his permanent disability” 56 to the court. 
From these cases, arguably it is not possible to assess the Supreme Court’s criterion to 
determine if a seafarer is considered to be disabled or not based on the break of the contractual 
relationship. Hence, there is a significant amount of uncertainty to be bore by the employer. 
                                                
 
53 NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or NYK Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernan-
dez, G.R. No. 161104, September 27, 2006, 
54 Ibid 
55 Gilbert Quizora, vs. Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), INC., G.R. No. 185412. November 16, 2011; 
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, et al. vs. Henry M. Simbajon, G.R. No. 203472. July 9, 2014 
56 Ai O. Eyana Vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Alain a. Garillos, Celebrity Cruises, Inc. (U.S.A.), G.R. 
No. 193468. January 28, 2015 
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The disability compensation amount is based on the schedule of disability57. Each grad 
is referred to a percentage. The amount of disability allowance is a fixed amount of 50,000 US 
dollars times the applicable percentage. Hence, if a seafarer suffers permanent disability as 
grad 1, the compensable amount would be 50,000 US dollars x 120.00%, a total of 60,000 US 
dollars.  
There are some issues invoved with the disability grading system in the contract.  
It could be found in the case NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or NYK Ship Management 
HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernandez 58 that thecompany-designated doctor made an 
assesment of disability of grad 9.5 which cannot be find in schedule providede in the contract. 
In another case Gilbert Quizora, vs. Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc.59, 
a seafarer was declared unfit for duty by PEME because he has varicose veins, which does not 
fall in the permanent disability grad schedule. The Supreme Court ruled that, an unfit for duty 
medical report dose not declared or has the same meaning that the seafarer has permanent dis-
ability.  
The disability is only based on the schedule provided in section 32. Therefore, the 
physical or mental condition of the seafarer is not the only aspect to be taken into account 
when assessing if the seafarer is to be characterized as disabled. Along with his health state, 
the particular ailment needs to match the disability schedule in the above-mentioned section of 
the contract. 
2.2.1.8 Section 32 A occupational diseases 
This section is the criterion to see if a disease is work-related. The listed disease is deemed as 
work-related if the correspondent nature of employment satisfied.  
It is provide in secion20A 4, that illness not listed here are disputably presumed as 
work-related. A broad of interpretation then appeared in disputes. In the case Dohle-Philman 
Manning Angency Inc., et al. vs. Heirs of Andres Gazzingan represented by Lenie L. Gazzin-
                                                
 
57 See Annex 1. 
58 NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or NYK Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernan-
dez, G.R. No. 161104, September 27, 2006, 
59 Gilbert Quizora, vs. Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc., G.R. No. 185412. November 16, 2011 
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gan 60, the Supreme Court ruled that if the working nature of the seafarer aggravated his illness, 
the illness is deemed as work-related. In spite of the fact that this case was also concerning 
pre-existing illness.  
However, in the earlier case Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. and Marine & Transporta-
tion Services (SAUDIA), Ltd., vs. The Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration and Evelyn F. Arante 61, even the working condition 
worsened the seafarer health, the employer is not liable because the illness was pre-existing. 
As the court stated, sometimes cancer could be consider a pre-existing illness. Therefore the 
seafarer will not be entitled to receive any benefit. Nevertheless cancer is one of the occupant 
diseases listed in section 32A of the contract. Hence, as long as the seafarer got the disease 
due to the conditions set up therein, like exposure to substances such as magenta, the cancer 
would be considered a work-related disease.  
An exception was provided in the note, “death or disability which is directly cause by 
sexually transmitted diseases or arose from complications thereof shall not be compensable 
nor shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the contract” 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
As it was shown above, according to the POEA SEC, only work-related illness, injury or death 
is compensable, and the event must happen during the employment period. It is the company-
designated physician to determine if the ailment is work-related and further assess the disabil-
ity grad, if needed, based on the schedule provided in section 32. When there is conflict be-
tween company-designated physician and seafarer’s doctor, a third doctor may be agreed by 
both parties, and the assessment from the third doctor shall be final and binding. 
The disease listed in section 32 A with conditions therein satisfied is also considered 
work-related. Those illness are not in the section 32A is deemed as work-related if prove by 
substantial evidence. 
                                                
 
60 Dohle-Philman Manning Angency Inc., et al. vs. Heirs of Andres Gazzingan represented by Lenie L. Gazzin-
gan, G.R. No. 199568. June 17, 2015 
61 Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. and Marine & Transportation Services (SAUDIA), Ltd., vs. The Hon. National 
Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and Evelyn F. Arante, G.R. No. 
84812. October 5, 1990 
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However, in practice, there exist different views exposed in the Supreme Court decision 
and made decisions based on other ground than the terms regulated in the contracts.  
 21 
 
3 Decision 
3.1 Total permanent disability 
When a seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness and further cause a permanent physical 
disability, he will be entitled to disability allowance. The grad of disability and the allowance 
amount is based on the schedule provided in section 32 of the contract.  
However, in the following cases, instead of using the basis provided in the contract, the 
Supreme Court made decisions based on other source of law, i.e. Labor Code. 
3.1.1 Disability grading criterion 120-day rule62 
In August 1998, a chief mate was diagnosed ill due to a problem with his neck and repatriated 
since it was found that he was unfit for duty. Later, it was found out that the cause behind his 
suffering was cancer. As a result, he had his treatment in Manila, in September of the same 
year. In this context, the company-designated physician assessed the permanently disability 
grading as 9. The chief mate sought for another doctor’s certificate and got the assessment as 
permanently disability grading 1(the most severe). 
The Labor Arbitrator ruled that the chief mate was entitled to the compensation as pro-
vided for total disability grading 1. NLRC first overturned the LA decision and ruled that the 
petitioner only needed to pay the compensation as disability grade 9, impediment, as the com-
pany-designated doctor assessed. On the motion of reconsideration, NLRC affirmed the ruling 
from LA and set aside the assessment made the company-designated specialist by stating that  
“However, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, citing jurisprudence 
that findings of company-designated doctors are self-serving, the NLRC af-
firmed the ruling of the RAB with respect only to the award of disability bene-
fits.”63 
In 2005, the Supreme Court cited the definition of disability as it was stated “Perma-
nent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regard-
                                                
 
62 Crystal Shipping, Inc., and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen vs. Deo P. Natividad, G.R. NO. 154798. October 20, 
2005 
63 Ibid 
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less of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body64.” As the Supreme Court ruled 
in this case, the seafarer was entitled to receive compensation as if he had permanent disability 
and says: “Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 
120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body65.” In spite of 
the fact that the chief mate was clearly able to resume his activities, since he had begun to 
work in March 2001. Moreover, he kept working for three years more.  
This is the famous Crystal case. Such decision was responsible for bringing about a so-
called “120-day rule”, which shocked the entire maritime industry. In fact, the definition of 
permanent total disability that was quoted in that decision relates to disputes which arose in 
connection with the Labor Code66 instead of being based on standard contracts. In the disputes 
mentioned, the compensation should be paid by the “system67”, that is to say, the Social Secu-
rity System (“SSS”) and the Government Service Insurance System (“GSIS”)68. In light of this, 
the manning industry argues that labour law principles do not apply to seafarers69. Also in the 
previous case Roberto Ravago vs. Esso Eastern Marine, Ltd., et al.70 the Supreme Court clear 
ruled that a seafarer is a contractual employee and contracted to work for a fixed period of 
time. His obligation and rights are regulated in the contract every time he signed. He is not a 
regular employee as defined in Labor Code Art. 280.  
In the motion of reconsideration, the petitioner (Crystal Shipping) argued that accord-
ing to the POEA SEC, total disability should be based only on the gradings provided under 
section 32 and the gradings should be assessed and determined by the company-designated 
physician.  
                                                
 
64 Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz, G.R. No. 154093, 8 July 2003; Ijares v. Court of Appeals, 
G.R. No. 105854, 26 August 1999 
65 Ibid 
66 Labor Code Article 192 3.1. “Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty 
(120) days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;” 
67 Labor Code Article 192 1. “Under such regulations as the Commission may approve, any employee under this 
Title who contracts sickness or sustains an injury resulting in his permanent total disability shall, for each month 
until his death, be paid by the System during such a disability…” 
68 Labor Code Article 167 5. “"System" means the SSS or GSIS, as the case may be” 
69 Gard P&I news 189, 01 February 2008, http://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/52758/personal-injury-
permanent-disability-in-the-philippines 
70 Roberto Ravago vs. Esso Eastern Marine, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 158324. March 14, 2005 
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In 2007, in the resolution71 of the Crystal case, the Supreme Court clarified that under 
POEA SEC the disability should only be based on the grade and not on the number of days by 
stating “Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 does not measure 
disability in terms of number of days but by gradings only.”72. In spite of the clarification pro-
vided by the resolution, the decision was not overturned. The Supreme Court explained that 
the employer misread the decision.  
The precious decision took into account the assessment from the seafarer’s doctor. 
Since the seafarer assigned doctor made an assessment that the seafarer is under disability grad 
1, thus he was entitled disability benefits, even thought the company-designated physician 
only assessed his disability as grad 9. The Supreme Court upheld the NLRC’s opinion that 
“medical certificates issued by company-designated physicians are palpably self-serving and 
biased in favor of the company who sought their services and therefore should not be given 
evidentiary weight and value.” For this reason, the Supreme Court maintained the opinion 
concerning conflicts between company-designated physician and the doctor appointed by the 
seafarer and refused to give weight to company-designated doctors’ assessment. 
After the correction of the way to measure disability, the Supreme Court still cited the 
Crystal case and made the decision based on the “120-day rule” as the criterion to meet total 
and permanently disability in the subsequent cases73. It seems like the Supreme Court does not 
                                                
 
71 Crystal Shipping, Inc., and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen, vs. Deo P. Natividad, G.R. No. 154798. February 12, 
2007 
72 Ibid 
73 Decisions made based on 120 day rule:  
Source: UK P&I club, Philippine Shipping Update, Issue 2012/09, 
http://www.ukpandi.com/loss-prevention/article/philippine-shipping-update-issue-2012-09-5601/  
1. United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or Holland America Line, Inc. vs. Francisco Beseril, G.R. No. 165934, April 
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Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd., Bonifacio Gomez and Alberto Gomez vs. Benedicto Suganob, G.R. No. 
168753, July 9, 2008; Joelson O. Iloreta vs. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and Norbulk Shipping U.K. 
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Quitoriano vs. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., Ma. Theresa Gutay and/or Atle Jebsens Management A/S, G.R. No. 
179868, January 21, 2010; Oriental Ship Management Co., Inc. vs. Romy Bastol, G.R. No. 186289, June 29, 
2010; Carmelito Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping Corporation and/or Sejin Lines Company Limited, G.R. No. 
176884, October 19, 2011; Fil-Star Maritime Corp., et.al. vs. Hanziel Rosete, G.R. No. 192686, November 23, 
2011 
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follow the resolution strictly. Moreover, a new criterion to meet total and permanent disability 
was developed by the Supreme Court in the case analyzed in the following section. 
3.1.2 Disability grading criterion 240-day rule74 
In September 2000, a Filipino seafarer, employed as a pumpman on board, was sent home 
because of work-related eye injury and he felt he was losing his vision. After the treatment, in 
January 2001, the seafarer’s vision is back to 20/20 for both eyes, with correction, thus the 
company-designated physician assessed the seafarer is fit for duty. Then the seafarer sought 
another doctor for further treatment. The non company-designated doctor consider him was 
not fit for duty. Then the seafarer filed a petition for total and permanent disability and cited 
the 120-day rule established in the Crystal case as an argument. 
The Labour Arbitrator gave merit to seafarer. In the appeal, NLRC reversed the decision 
from LA, denied the seafarer’s complaint. In the court of appeal via a petition for certiorari 
affirmed the decision from NLRC. Then the petition went in front of the Supreme Court. Su-
preme Court ruled that the petitioner (seafarer) lack of merit and dismissed the complaint and 
explained: 
“As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, 
must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from 
arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no 
case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is 
totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is 
declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the com-
pany to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined un-
der the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine 
laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made 
because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary to-
tal disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to 
the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial 
or total disability already exists.”75 
In this case, there was no dispute that the seafarer suffered a work-related injury. While 
there was no opinion from an agreed third doctor, the Supreme Court upheld the assessment as 
fit for duty by the company-designated physician in accordance with the POEA SEC, stated 
                                                
 
74 Jesus E. Vergara, vs. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. and Atlantic Marine Ltd., G.R. No.  172933. October 
6, 2008 
75 Ibid 
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“…we find the NLRC and the CAs conclusions on the petitioners fitness to work, based on the 
assessment/certification by the company-designated physician, to be legally and factually in 
order.” rather than the assessment from seafarer appointed doctor. Those opinions are in ac-
cordance with POEA SEC terms.  
Under POEA SEC section32 concerning the schedule of total and permanent disability, 
only when the seafarer is blind or total and permanent loss of vision of both eyes consists the 
disability grading 1. It is known from the case fact that both of the seafarer’s eyes are in good 
condition thus the seafarer’s condition did not meet the criterion of grading 1.  
In the decision the Supreme Court first declared that the benefit and compensation pay-
ment system under POEA SEC differs from the system under the Labor Code76, this is the 
same principle as above mentioned in section 20A 7. In the other hand, explain all the disputes 
arising from POEA SEC shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines as 
POEA SEC regulated and cited articles from Labor Code. 
“Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty (120) 
days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;”77 Differ from Crystal case, the Supreme 
Court focused on the last part of this article “the Rule”, and referred to Rule X, Section 2 of 
the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code78. Based on the Rule, the 
Supreme Court ruled  
“A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by 
the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the 
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expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a decla-
ration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.” 79 
In the other words, a temporary total disability for more than 240 days becomes perma-
nent disability.  
Apparently the Supreme Court set the disability schedule in the binding contract aside and 
made a new criterion to determined permanent disability again. This decision made a so-called 
240-day rule. It can be found in the subsequent cases80 that the Supreme Court cited Vergara 
case and made decision based on 240-day rule. 
The Supreme Court further denied the seafarer’s 120-days argument stated that: 
“Crystal Shipping was a case where the seafarer was completely unable 
to work for three years and was undisputably unfit for sea duty due to 
respondent's need for regular medical check-up and treatment which 
would not be available if he were at sea. While the case was not clear on 
how the initial 120-day and subsequent temporary total disability period 
operated…”81 
This decision was made merely a year after the Crystal case resolution, which clari-
fied the criteria to meet permanent disability is not based on numbers of days. The Supreme 
Court in this case not only set aside the criteria of disability under contract terms but also al-
tered its own resolution and extended the 120 days criterion in Crystal case to 240 days. 
It seems like the Supreme Court has establish its own standard to exam if the seafarer 
is in total permanent disability. However, in the recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
depend on the circumstance, the 240 day rule is not applied to every case in certain condition. 
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3.1.3 Neither 120 days nor 240 days apply 
In Crystal case the Supreme Court make decision based on 120-day rule as the criterion to 
meet total and permanent disability, In spite of the resolution, in the Vergara case changed the 
previous criterion and based on 240-day rule. Though as it could be found, that many cases 
ruled based on either 120 days or 240 days as the criteria to meet permanent disability, how-
ever, both of the rules do not absolute apply to every case. 
As it can be found in the recent case Splash Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Ronulfo G. Ruizo82, 
in December, 2005, a seafarer felt pain in his lumber and groin during on board the ship and 
was diagnosed with “Block Right Kidney by Stone Repeat U/S showed No Improvement” by 
a Medical center in Australia. At the time he finished his contract on December 21, 2005, he 
was sent to a company-designated physician and was diagnosed with a kidney ailment. He was 
suggested to a further medical check-up. In the period he was under treatment, he filed a peti-
tion for permanent disability benefits due to unable to work for more than 120 days. In Febru-
ary 5, 2007, the seafarer did not undertake the extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy, which the 
physician believed ““[t]here  is  possibility  of declaring the patient fit to work after treat-
ment.”83 In May 07,2007, the seafarer sought for another internist who assessed him as disa-
bility grading seven.  
The LA rule that the seafarer was not entitled any disability benefit since there was no 
such assessment made by the company-designated doctor and his refusal to undergo the treat-
ment provided by the employer. Also the seafarer alleged that he was unable to work for 120 
days. Nonetheless, the 120 days rule was already reviewed by the Supreme Court in the Crys-
tal case resolution. The complaint was denied by the NLRC. The CA granted the seafarer’s 
disability benefit held that he was unable to work for 120 days thus he was deemed as perma-
nent disability.  
The Supreme Court opined that the 120 days rule has been clarified by the Crystal case 
resolution, which in turn was modified by the Supreme Court in the Vergara case. The cir-
cumstances should be exam to decide if the 120 days rule or the 240 days rule applies. 
                                                
 
82 Splash Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Ronulfo G. Ruizo, G.R. No. 193628. March 19, 2014 
83 Ibid 
 28 
In this case, the seafarer was under treatment in the initial 120 days period and under-
went a further treatment afterwards. Thus, the focus should shift to the issue that there was no 
declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability upon the maxi-
mum 240 days. The reason that the company-designated doctor did not make the assessment 
was that the seafarer failed to show up to follow the suggestion treatment, which would make 
him cured. Hence, it was not the company-designated physician’s fault that there was no disa-
bility assessment or fitness declaration. It was the seafarer’s refusal to undergo the treatment 
and escaped the possibility of recovery from the illness. Besides, even the seafarer’s doctor 
gave him disability grad as 7, which is only partial permanent instead of total permanent disa-
bility. The Supreme Court concluded that the seafarer was not entitled to any disability benefit.  
From above decision, it could be found that neither 120 days rule nor 240 days rule 
was applicable if the seafarer and the employer agreed to extend the treatment when it is need-
ed. In this case, the Supreme Court on one hand invoked the Crystal case resolution that disa-
bility is not based on days of treatment, however, in the other hand, it did not deny the 240 
days rule that the temporary disability becomes permanent if company-designated doctor de-
clare so or upon the expiration of the maximum 240 days. 
In the above cases, there are three different criteria from the Supreme Court. The first 
was established in the Crystal case and concerns the 120 days rule. The second was stated in 
Vergara case, regarding the 240 days rule. Finally, the last criterion was advanced in the case 
Splash Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Ronulfo G. Ruizo84, and addresses the conditions in which 
the 240 days rule is not applicable. Notwithstanding, none of them followed the terms and 
conditions in the contract. 
According to Philippine law the Supreme Court only rules on questions of law85. 
Moreover, there are different criteria to be met before a case is brought to that court, procedur-
al requirements. In case a petition does not meet this requirement, the Supreme Court can dis-
miss a case through the adaption of minute resolutions. The latter consists of decisions usually 
denying a petition and concern only procedural matters. In this context, a minute resolution 
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must not advance new arguments or establish new grounds for a question of law, not related to 
precede issues. 
The Philippine Constitution prescribes that the Supreme Court must provide a decision 
within a maximum period of 24 months86. Notwithstanding, in practices, the court takes a few 
years to do so. 
Also, according to Philippine law, the decisions of the Supreme Court are to be consid-
ered source of law. The Supreme Court provides the guidelines to interpret the Constitution 
and its decisions must not have retroactive effect. However, depending on the circumstances, 
those decisions can bear the mark of retroactivity.  
The judicial system in the Philippine is guided by the doctrine of the stare decisis. That 
is to say, once a question of law has been analyzed it should be shielded against further argu-
ment. Additionally, all the other courts based in that country are required by law to follow the 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court.  
Usually, the decisions of the Supreme Court are also binding upon the latter. However, 
it may review its own precedent if the circumstances so provide. Notwithstanding, the court 
must have strong grounds to deviate from an established precedent. 
As it can be found from the above-mentioned cases, the Supreme Court does not fol-
low the rule relating to the act of issuing a resolution. Moreover, it is not possible to draw the 
conclusion that the Supreme Court used the Crystal case resolution as a way of establishing a 
precedent, given the fact, that new criteria were advanced by the court. 
3.2 Which doctor’s assessment should be trusted 
As it states in the contract, it is the company-designated doctor to make assessment. The sea-
farer can also seek for another doctor’s opinion. If there is conflict between these two doctors, 
a third doctor can be appointed by both parties. The third doctor’s opinion shall be final and 
binding. 
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3.2.1 Company-designated physician 
In June 1995, a seafarer was ill on board while the vessel is at the port of New Zealand. 
His condition was reported to the ship’s master. Instead of sending the seafarer to the hospital 
in New Zealand right away, the master chose to arrange the seafarer disembarked in the next 
port, Manila. After ten days, the vessel arrived in Manila and waited for hours to enter the port 
due to berth congestion. Finally from 24 June 1995 to 26 July 1995, the seafarer was under 
treatment by a team of medical specialists. A company-designated doctor assessed that the 
seafarer may be allowed to go back to work. Another certificate from the doctor attending the 
seafarer’s treatment assessed he has partial disability and is not fit for duty. The seafarer then 
filed a petition for sickness allowance and disability allowance. 
The LA opined that the uncertainty in the assessment of may be fit for duty, could also 
be unfit for work. Thus it should give weight to the assessment of the doctor handling the sea-
farer’s treatment. The NRLC and court of appeal affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court 
further sated, it is the employer designated which hospital the seafarer should be confined, and  
“the very act of paying the hospital bills by the petitioners (employer) consti-
tutes their confirmation of such designation….The Court agrees with the ap-
pellate courts ruling that petitioners (employer) act of committing private re-
spondent for treatment at the Manila Doctors Hospital and paying the hospital 
bills therein is tantamount to company-designation.” 87 
As mentioned above, the seafarer was sent to the company designated hospital for 
treatment. The Supreme Court upheld that the assessment from the specialist who undertook 
the treatment is more reliable than that of the company-designated doctor who just did an as-
sessment but no treatment. 
In the recent case Ricardo A. Dalusong Vs. Eagle Clarc Shipping Philippines, Inc., et 
al.88, the seafarer was repatriated due to work injury and assessed disability grad 8 after an ini-
tial treatment. He further received a serious treatment and was finally assessed as disability 
grad 11 by the company-designated doctor. Two month later, he got an assessment stated that 
he was suffering partial permanent disability and unfit for sea duty from a private doctor. Then 
he filed a petition for total permanent disability benefit. 
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The LA ruled that since the company-designated final assessed the seafarer as disability 
grad 11, he was only entitled disability benefit as such grad. The NLRC, however, overturn the 
decision and stated that the seafarer was unable to work for 120 days and is unfit for sea duty. 
The CA reinstated the decision and opinion from the LA. 
The Supreme Court held that the assessment by the doctor who carried out the seafarer’s 
serious treatment and exam is more appropriate to given weight instead of the another doctor 
just assessed the seafarer’s condition once. 
3.2.2 Third doctor 
According to the contract, in the absence of a third doctor, the company-designated 
physician’s assessment should be given weight. In the Crystal case, the company-designated 
was considered “self-serving” and the assessment was set aside. But in recent cases, the third 
doctor rule seems to be reinstated. 
In the case Julius R. Tagalog vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., et al.89, the seafarer 
was declared fit for duty by the company-designated doctor after several months treatment. 
Later the seafarer sought for another private doctor’s assessment and the result was unfit for 
duty. The Supreme Court upheld the assessment by company-designated doctor, because under 
the contract the seafarer should have to seek for a third doctors opinion, there was no a third 
doctor’s opinion, and further stated: “the private doctor had only examined petitioner once 
while the company-designated physician had monitored petitioner’s medical condition for sev-
eral months.”90 
The Supreme Court also emphasized in other cases Rommel B. Daraug vs. KGJS Fleet 
Management, Manila, Inc., et al. and Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc./ Maersk Services Ltd., 
and/or Mr. Jerome Delos Angeles vs. Nelson Mesina91, that if there’s conflict between doctors, 
a third doctor may be agreed jointly between both parties. The opinion from the third doctor 
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should be final and binding. “The duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the 
employee for disability benefits”92 
In 14 January 2015, the NLRC issued a memorandum about “Third Doctor on Disability 
Claims of Seafarers.” When there is a dispute related to the conflict between company-
designated doctor and seafarer’s doctor, and no third doctor was appoint. The Labor Arbiters 
will give 15 days to parties to secure this service of a third doctor. If a third doctor is assigned 
in this period, he will have 30 days to give his assessment, and it is final and binding. If parties 
fail to assigned a third doctor, the reason will be recorded and provide to the Research, Infor-
mation and Publication Division of the NLRC. 
3.3 If the illness, disease or death compensable 
As previous mentioned in section 2.2.1 of this work, two prerequisite, the event happened in 
the employment period and it is work-related, must to be meet in order to the seafarer entitle 
compensation and benefits under POEA SEC section 20. The following sections only focus on 
if the illness, disease or death falls in the scope of compensable. 
3.3.1 Work-related disease 
The work-related diseases are those diseases listed in the Section 32-A of the contract. In spite 
of acquire the listed illness, also the four condition must be also satisfied in order to entitle the 
compensation. If the illness is not in the list, it is disputably presumed as work-related, but the 
seafarer has to prove that the working nature has aggravated or worsen the ailment. Notwith-
standing, in the case Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc., et al. vs. Edgar A. Balasta 93, the Su-
preme Court seems to consider that a particular illness is not important when it comes to the 
compensation at issue. In its decision the court stated that: 
 “it is not the injury which illness compensated but rather the incapacity 
to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity…. the list 
of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A does not preclude other illness-
es/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC can-
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not be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer 
unfit for further sea duties.”94 
However, the illness is important to the contract.  
Afterwards, the court seemed to reveal its previous ruling. In September 2006, a sea-
farer carried out PEME and was declared fit for duty and then worked as 4th engineer onboard 
a vessel. In May 2007, he felt pain on his abdomen accompanied by “chills, diarrhea, general 
feeling of weakness and muscle spasms”95. He was repatriated in May 12, 2007. Five days 
later, on May 17, 2007, the seafarer informed his employer that he had to receive Whipple 
surgery, and employer agreed that the cost would be paid back to him. On 18 June 2007, the 
company-designated doctor, who is a cancer surgeon, assessed the seafarer that he suffered 
non work-related illness and no grad of disability was made. The seafarer then filed a petition 
for disability benefit.  
The disability benefit was awarded by the LA. The LA set aside the company-
designated physician’s assessment and opined the seafarer “did not need to establish causal 
connection between his work and his illness” and his risk of contracting the illness is increased 
by the working nature.  
The NLRC gave weight to the company-designated doctor’s assessment and rule that 
the seafarer failed to provide evidence to prove that the illness is work-related or was worsen 
by the working nature. “That he contracted the illness during his employment contract does 
not automatically translate to its work-relatedness.”  
The CA opined that the seafarer’s working environment is enough to prove that he ex-
posed to a condition, which aggravate his illness. 
The Supreme Court concluded that if the seafarer is entitled to compensation and bene-
fits under POEA SEC section 20, the following conditions must be met and proves by the sea-
farer. First, the seafarer is suffering an illness. Second, the illness must happen during the term 
of the contract. Third, the seafarer must follow the 3 days mandatory post-employment report 
procedure. Forth, the illness must be work-related. And last, the illness is one if the occupant 
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disease listed in the section 32-A and the conditions provided therein satisfied. The comment 
on the dispute concerning work-related says: 
“the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensa-
tion and/or benefits claim; the seafarer must still prove his entitlement to disa-
bility benefits by substantial evidence of his illness' work-relatedness.” 96 
This implies that the disputable presumption clause does not prescribe that all the ill-
ness is work-related. On the other hand, if the illness can be proved by substantial evidence 
instead of mere allegation, even it is not one of the disease listed in the contract, the proved 
illness is work-related. 
Besides his failure to prove that the illness is work-related, the seafarer sent him self to 
company-designated doctor five days after repatriation which already exceed the three day 
mandatory report requirement and his right to claim is forfeit. 
Along with this, the definition of sickness in the Labor Code Article 173 (l) prescribes 
that sickness is related to an illness permanently deemed as work-related listed by the Com-
mission, or any ailment stemming from the nature of work, which is subject to proof that the 
working conditions increase the risk or contracting such an illness. The Code also states that 
the Commission is responsible for determining and approving occupational and work-related 
diseases in order to assess the right to receive compensation, taking in to account the hazards 
of the employment. 
However, the POEA SEC has its own definition in the contract. The decision should 
examine the contract terms and conditions and use the labor code to supplement the contract 
only if there is any ambiguous in the interpretation. 
3.3.2 Distinguishing between pre-existing illness or work-aggravated ailment 
According to the terms of the contract, only work-related illness and death is compensable. 
And it is nevertheless not compensable if the ailment is pre-existing before the contract. As 
mentioned above, the PEME cannot show the true health condition of a seafarer. There are 
some cases in which the seafarers were declared fit for duty after a PEME. Notwithstanding, 
the Supreme Court placed different opinion in these cases. 
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In the case Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. and Marine & Transportation Services 
(SAUDIA), Ltd., vs The Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine overseas Em-
ployment Administration and Evelyn F. Arante97, a captain at the period of his contract went to 
a hospital and was diagnosed as "gastro-duodenitis" when the vessel stayed in a port on July 
19, 1986,. Three days after he relieved from captain position. He was noticed by the employer 
to undergo a medical exam on his own expense upon arrival to Philippine. In this further exam 
found that the captain has "non-functioning GALL BLADDER" due to NIDDM (Non-Insulin 
Dependent Diabetic Mellitus). He was advised to have weekly exam. On January 8, 1987, his 
medical report showed that he also has cancer of pancreas. On January 31, 1987, he filed a 
complaint for medical expense to POEA. He died on June 29, 1987. Then his wife filed a peti-
tion for death compensation and benefits. 
The POEA administrator awarded the seafarer and stated the seafarer has the illness 
during the contract no matter if it is work-related. Then the respondent commission affirmed 
the decision on appeal. The Supreme Court overturned the decision and opined:  
“It cannot be said that the disease, which caused his death, occurred during his 
employment. The pre-employment medical examination conducted upon him 
could not have divulged his disease considering the fact that most, if not all, 
such examinations are not so exploratory. Therefore, it would be unfair to hold 
petitioners liable for the amount of death compensation provided for under the 
standard format contract for such award is unwarranted under the circum-
stances.” 
A similar decision could also be found in the case NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or 
NYK Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernandez98, a contracted seafarer 
was found fit for duty in PEME and declared he has no disease or ailment. Twenty-five days 
after he joined the vessel, he suffered high fever and pains at his left hip socket. The seafarer 
was repatriated and received treatment from company-designated doctor. During the treat-
ment he admitted that nine days before the employment he experienced “fever…moderate to 
high grade, intermittent, associated with chills, body malaise and pain on [the] lumbosacral 
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area radiating to left lower extremity”99. Later found out the unusual health condition is septic 
arthritis and/or avascular necrosis. Before he underwent a surgery, he filed a complaint100 for 
disability compensation as grad 1. After the surgery, the company-designated doctor gave 
opinion that the seafarer will be able to independent in daily life activity but is not fit for 
work on board vessels and assessed disability grading half of nine101.. 
The LA ruled that the seafarer was entitled the disability equivalent to the amount of 
6530 US dollars benefits as half of nine as the company-designated doctor assessed. The 
NLRC found company-designated doctor negligence because there is no grad half of nine in 
the grad schedule, plus the seafarer is no longer able to work on board vessels thus the seafarer 
was entitled compensation as permanent disability. The court of appeal affirmed the decision 
from the NLRC. The Supreme Court then found septic arthritis and/or avascular necrosis, 
which the seafarer suffered, was caused by pre-existing illness. Thus the seafarer was not enti-
tled to disability compensation. 
In front of the Supreme Court, the seafarer argued that he has been declared fit for duty 
by the PEME implied that he was in a health condition before the contract period. In the deci-
sion from the Supreme Court,  
“While a PEME may reveal enough for petitioners (employer) to decide 
whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to 
inform petitioners of a seafarers true state of health. The PEME could not have 
divulged respondents illness considering that the examinations were not ex-
ploratory…claim that the issuance of a clean bill of health to a seafarer after a 
PEME means that his illness was acquired during the seafarers employment is 
a non sequitor.”102 
It is to say, again, a declared fit for duty PEME is not enough to show that the seafarer 
was perfectly healthy or has no pre-existing illness before the contract.  
The LA in this case, in one hand followed the contract term accredited the assessment 
made by company-designated doctor, in the other hand did not exam the contract thoroughly 
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and prudently that there is no half grad in the disability schedule. There is no applicable per-
centage in the disability allowance schedule could be found. 
The NLRC and the court of appeal directly set aside the compensable disability criteria 
only looked the fact that the seafarer could not be employ the profession as seafarer and re-
warded him the highest level of disability. 
“A seafarer is a contractual, not a regular employee, and his employment is 
contractually fixed for a certain period of time. His employment, including 
claims for death or illness compensations, is governed by the contract he signs 
every time he is hired, and is not rooted from the provisions of the Labor 
Code.”103 
This case showed that in the settlement system, one court does not coordinate in the 
basis of decision with the other. The Supreme Court was correct in denying the benefits to the 
seafarer, given the fact that it was a pre-existing illness, something that can be inferred from 
the words of the seafarer himself. On the other hand, the LA was wrong in confirming the 
company-designated doctor assessment, since no 9.5 grad can be found in the contract. This 
case clearly illustrates that sometimes deciding organs in the system do not follow the contract, 
causing the existence of a significant amount of uncertainty, and exposing the employer to a 
great risk. 
From above mentioned two cases, PEME is not a thorough physical examine and could 
not tell the true health condition of a seafarer. A fit for duty certificate is not an automatic 
proof that the seafarer has no pre-existing illness. 
However, sometimes the Supreme Court ruled it is compensable even the illness is pre-
existing and was known by both employer and employee. 
In the case Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, INC., and Dominion Insurance 
Corporation, vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Benjamin T. Tuazon104, a seafarer 
had a heart surgery in 1986. In 1991, before he was assigned to work on board, the employer 
asked him to provide a certificate that he could do normal physical activities. He provided the 
said certificate then later he was declared fit for duty. One day during his contract period, his 
felt coughing and shortness of breathing and was confined in a hospital in a foreign port from 
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December 12 to 27. The doctor diagnosed that he needed heart surgery thus he was repatriated 
in the next day. Then he had a heart surgery by a company-designated doctor in Philippine. He 
also bore the cost of medical treatment. The seafarer then filed a petition ask for sickness al-
lowance and disability benefit. 
The Supreme Court rule that the seafarer had done with the obligation to disclose his 
medical history, and he also provided a certificate that he could do normal physical work, thus 
the later heart surgery was resulted from the working nature of the seafarer on board ship.  
 “Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted prior to his 
employment, this still would not deprive him of compensation benefits. For 
what matters is that his work had contributed, even in a small degree, to the 
development of the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither is 
it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have 
been in perfect health at the time he contracted the disease. A worker brings 
with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment, and while the 
employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he 
finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate 
cause of the employee's death for which compensation is sought, the previous 
physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had 
for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease”105 
The above words from the Supreme Court that the seafarer could be entitled to compensation 
and benefits even the illness is pre-existing is apparent against the terms in the contract.  
The same wrong basis to decide could also be found in the case Dohle-Philman Manning An-
gency, Inc., et al. vs. Heirs of Andres Gazzingan106, a seafarer underwent the PEME before 
his employment and was declared fit for duty but at the same time he was found ventricular 
hypertrophy in his electrocardiogram. He embarked onboard as a mess boy within one month. 
During his service period, he suffered chest pain when the vessel alongside at a port in Co-
lombia. Then he was diagnosed to have Acute Type-B Dissection. After his repatriate, he 
received medical treatment. On august 8, 2006, he was informed from company-designate 
doctor that he suffered from a non work-related illness and the sickness allowance was paid 
until the same day. He was under treatment until September 06, at the same year. The seafarer 
filed a petition for total disability compensation. 
                                                
 
105 Ibid 
106 Dohle-Philman Manning Angency, Inc., et al. vs. Heirs of Andres Gazzingan, G.R. No. 199568. June 17, 2015, 
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The LA granted the seafarer 50,000 US dollars, the correct amount for total disability 
should be 60,000 US dollars instead, for total disability benefit, “…it is enough that the nature 
of the seafarer’s work had contributed even in a small degree to the development of the dis-
ease…” The NLRC overturned LA decision on the basis that the company-designated doctor’s 
assess the illness is not work-related thus deny the claim of disability compensation. The court 
of appeal set aside the decision form the NLRC and reinstalled the decision from LA. 
The Supreme Court denied the assessment by company-designated doctor, which was 
based on PEME instead of post-employment examination. And also quote the same decision 
from NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or NYK Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC 
and Lauro A. Hernandez case107, that the PEME cannot show the true health condition of the 
seafarer. Then the Supreme Court agreed that the seafarer suffered a work-related illness and 
further cited a case108, which was ruled and based on 120-day rule disability criterion, and 
ruled that the seafarer is qualified for the total and permanent disability.  
Unfortunately, it seems that in the case NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or NYK 
Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernandez the Supreme Court wrongly 
cited the PEME as a shield. This is because PEME is not a detailed exam. Thus the Supreme 
Court considered that the seafarer cannot rely on this exam as an alternative to show that he 
did not have a pre-existing illness. On the other hand, in the case Dohle-Philman Manning 
Angency, Inc., et al. vs. Heirs of Andres Gazzingan, the PEME found a disease. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court chose to ignore such a finding stating that the PEME is not a detailed exam. 
Therefore, it could not be used to assert the presence of a pre-existing illness. Arguably, the 
court reasoning in this case is wrong, due to the fact that if the PEME found a disease, the fact 
that this exam is not exploratory cannot be used to discard the allegation of a pre-existing ill-
ness in cases where the exam found one.  
In the earlier case Jebsens Maritime Inc., represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or 
Alliance Marine Services, Lld., vs. Enrique Undag109, the seafarer has to prove his illness is 
                                                
 
107 NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. and/or NYK Ship Management HK., Ltd., vs. NLRC and Lauro A. Hernan-
dez, G.R. No. 161104, September 27, 2006 
108 Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc. and/or Tankoil Carriers, Ltd. vs. Cristina Candava, G.R. No. 201251, June 26, 
2013, Second Division 
109 Jebsens Maritime Inc., represented by Ms. Arlene Asuncion and/or Alliance Marine Services, Lld., vs. Enri-
que Undag, G.R. No. 191491. December 14, 2011, 
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work-related by substantial evidence instead of mere allegations. Thus, in spite of the fact that 
for the court it is possible that the nature of the work could have contributed just to a small 
degree to aggravate the illness it is nevertheless for the seafarer to prove that the activity per-
formed is directly connected to the injury. Therefore while the court acknowledges that the 
degree of the injury do not need to be severe it on the other hand requires due proof of the fact. 
This is a mechanism to avoid fraud or false allegations.  
Notwithstanding, the court does not define what is to be considered this small degree. 
For instance, in the case Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Manage-
ment (Asia) Pte. Ltd. vs. Juanito G. Bengson110, the Supreme Court stated, “[i]t is already rec-
ognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear 
and tear of the human body.” Caution should be taken in order not to erode the line between 
the normal wear and tear of the body resulting from any labor and a work-related illness. Oth-
erwise there would be too much risk to be bore by the employer. 
If according to Philippine Labor Code111 in case of doubt or uncertainty, shall inter-
preter in favor of the labor. On the other hand, the risk the employer/shipowner shall bear 
should never be too great so as to undermine contractual relationship. In this vein, the uncer-
tainty created by the absence of a reasonable criterion behind the Supreme Court decision 
brings about a high degree of uncertainty and risk for the ship owner. 
3.3.3 Deliberate act 
It is not compensable if the injury, disability or death is caused by the seafarer’s deliberate act. 
In the case Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., and Reginaldo Oben/Wallem Shipmanagement 
Limited vs. Donnabelle Pedrajas and Sean Jade Pedrajas 112, a contracted seafarer found 
death with a rope tied his neck and was hanging on board the ship during the employment 
period while the vessel was in Italy. The Italian government authority then carried out the in-
vestigation of his death and found two suicide notes with him. The medicine examiner under-
went the autopsy and stated that the seafarer committed suicide by hanging himself and found 
                                                
 
110 Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte. Ltd. vs. Juanito G. Beng-
son, G.R. No. 198528. October 13, 2014 
111 Chapter I GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 4 Construction in favor of labor 
112 Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., and Reginaldo Oben/Wallem Shipmanagement Limited vs. Donnabelle Pe-
drajas and Sean Jade Pedrajas, G.R. No. 192993. August 11, 2014 
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the test result of cocaine was positive. The original document of the investigation was kept in 
Italy including two suicide notes. 
After the seafarer’s body sent back to Philippine, his family asked Philippine National 
Police Crime Laboratory to exam the body again and National Bureau of Investigation (here-
inafter NBI) to investigate the incident. The conclusion of both organizations is that homicide 
cannot be totally excluded. Then the spouse filed a claim for death compensation and benefits 
under POEA SEC. 
The LA ruled that the employer is not liable based on the Forensic Report from Italian 
authority that the seafarer committed suicide and his death was self-inflicted. The NLRC and 
the court of appeal overturned the LA decision saying that the seafarer’s death is not proven to 
be self-inflicted and did not give credence to the Forensic Report from Italy authority. 
The Supreme Court opined that it should give more weight to the report from Italy be-
cause the Italian authority investigated the death of the seafarer immediately after the incident. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the deliberate act by a seafarer resulting his death is not com-
pensable. 
Under POEA SEC, the burden of proof falls on the employer. In this case employer suc-
cessfully proved the seafarer’s death is resulting from his willful act by the Forensic Report. 
In the case Maritime Factors inc., vs., Bienvenido R. Hindang113, a seafarer was found 
by other crewmember that he was hanging by a strap on his neck in a kneeling position and 
died on board in his cabin with the door locked On July 27, 1994. The vessel was in the terri-
tory sea of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When the ship arrived in port, the authority of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia undertook the medical exam of the seafarer’s body. The medical 
examiner conducted an autopsy and concluded that the seafarer committed suicide by hanging 
himself. The original report was kept in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia When the body arrived 
in Philippine, the seafarer’s family asked the NBI to carry out another autopsy. The NBI con-
cluded that the cause of the seafarer’s death was Asphyxia by Strangulation, Ligature, and 
based on the autopsy findings meant that somebody caused the seafarer’s death. Then the 
brother filed a petition for the death compensation benefits. 
                                                
 
113 Maritime Factors inc., vs., Bienvenido R. Hindang, G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011 
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The LA conclude that under POEA SEC the burden to prove the seafarer was killing 
himself falls on the employer, and the employer is failed to do so, upheld the report from NBI 
that the seafarer did not commit suicide, and denied the medical report from Saudi Arabia au-
thority because it was submitted in photocopy and fax transmission form. An amount of 
50,000 US dollars was granted to the death compensation. The NLRC and the court of appeal 
affirmed the LA’s decision in all.  
The Supreme Court reversed the aforesaid decisions, opined that the Saudi Arabia au-
thority exam the seafarer in first-hand condition and conducted an autopsy, this evidence could 
not be set aside just because it is a photocopy or fax while the original document is kept in a 
foreign country. Besides both of the report did not mention there was any struggle or violence 
situation shown on the seafarer’s body, concluding that the seafarer committed suicide.  
Both of the cases show that, in principle, the employer is liable for the seafarer’s death 
during the term of his contract but “The employer may be exempt from liability if it can suc-
cessfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his de-
liberate or willful act.”114 It is as described in section 20 D of the contract. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
As it was shown in the study, there was no consistent interpretation and standard from 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court sometimes ruled the case based on the terms and con-
dition in the contract. However, in a comparative numbers of cases the Supreme Court wrong-
ly apply the Labor Code and made decision in favor of the seafarers.  
4 Dispute settlement procedure 
Before addressing the structure of the dispute settlement procedure, it is important to 
mention that according to Philippine Constitution all disputes must be solved in an amicable 
way, promoting the conciliation between the parties. Therefore, along with the judicial settle-
ment procedure, the Philippine system provides alternatives in the form of quasi-judicial bod-
ies. 
                                                
 
114 Crewlink,INC. and/or Gulf Marine Services, vs. Editha Teringtering,for her behalf and in behalf of minor 
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Philippine Constitution XIII, section3, paragraph 3 expressed, “The State shall promo-
te the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential 
use of voluntary mode in settling dispute, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutu-
al compliance herewith to foster industrial peace.” Also in Labour Code 217, 1.“… the Labour 
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide…” It is prescribed in 
the law to resolve the dispute amicably through arbitration. 
POEA was established by the mandate of DOLE Executive Order No 247. It has the 
original and exclusive jurisdiction to the claims and dispute arising from the POEA SEC115. 
According to the contract, if the disputes arise from a covered CBA, the parties shall solve the 
claim by voluntary arbitrator (“VA”) or panel of voluntary arbitrators (“PVA”). If there is no 
applicable CBA, the parties can also choose either VA/PVA or NLRC for the settlement. If 
there’s no provision governing the VA, NCMB was assigned to charge over of accredited vol-
untary arbitration matter.  
Concluding from above, if there is a covered CBA in the dispute, the seafarer should 
go to NCMB to seek for voluntary arbitration. In spite of the rules stated in the contract, the 
NLRC chairman Gerardo Nograles issued a Memorandum116 on 2 August, 2010, announcing 
that if the dispute involved a covered CBA, parties shall submit the dispute to NCMB. Since 
the study focuses only on cases arising from POEA SEC thus only the cases brought to NLRC 
are addressed. 
NLRC is a quasi-judicial organization attached to DOLE, which resolves dispute local-
ly and overseas.117 NLRC deals around 42,170 cases every year. “At the RABs (Regional Ar-
bitration Branches), 68% of the total cases are disposed of in favor of labor (workers), while 
32% in favor of management (employer). On appealed cases the Commission Proper disposed 
of 50% in favor of labor, and 50% in favor of management.118” 
                                                
 
115 POEA SEC Section 29 
116 “…you are hereby directed to immediately dismiss the complaint and/or terminates proceedings which were 
initially processed in the grievance machinery as provided for in the existing Collective Bargaining Agreements 
(CBAs) between the parties, through the issuance of an Order of Dismissal and referral of the disputes to the 
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration…” 
117 NLRC, “Mandate, Mission, Vision”, http://nlrc.dole.gov.ph/?q=node/5 
118 2013 Performance report of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 
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The quasi-judicial system follows a specific structure. Firstly, in the case of no appli-
cable CBA, the parties should resolve the dispute by the labour arbiter, which is compulsory 
arbitration, assigned by NLRC. Secondly, if one of the party is not satisfied with the decision, 
they can appeal to NLRC commission within ten days after the arbitration. Thirdly, after the 
appeal, they can ask motion for reconsideration with NLRC. If there is still no consensus be-
tween parties, they can submit petition to court of appeal. Denial of the motion for reconsider-
ation with NLRC is final and executory unless the court of appeal issues a temporary restrain-
ing order (“TRO”) within ten days. If the final decision is favorable to the seafarer, NLRC will 
issue the writ of execution and the employer has to give garnishment of the compensation. The 
employer can still forward the case to Supreme Court.  
This procedure seems to be more favorable to the seafarers. This is because the sea-
farer can ask the garnishment enforce in full before the finality from court of appeal or Su-
preme Court. This explains why P&I clubs criticize this procedure and propose a way of “es-
crow”.  
“It is better to enter a tiger’s mouth than a court of law”119 P&I clubs usually suggest 
shipowners to pay off the compensation, even it is a settlement under duress120, to prevent cost 
incurred by taking further legal action. But the “peaceful” way of solution didn't smooth the 
conflicts, it aggregate the numbers of similar cases instead. 
Seeing that the situation is getting worse, in 29 November 2013, a letter to NLRC, IG 
P&I proposed “Recognising escrow as a mode of executing the judgment award of the 
NLRC ” to DOLE in order to solve the problem of restitution when the decision by the 
NLRC/NCMB overturned by the CA or Supreme Court. Most of the situations are the ship-
owner couldn't get the garnishment back when the seafarer already spent all or part of the 
money.  
                                                
 
119 Steven N. Robinson, and George R.A. Doumar, (1987) ""It is Better to Enter a Tiger's Mouth than a Court of 
Law" or Dispute Resolution Alternatives in U.S.-China Trade," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 5: No. 
2, Article 5. 
120 IG Personal Injury Subcommittee, International Group position paper on Garnishment, 03 October 2013 
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Unfortunately, in the reply letter from DOLE says the “final and executing” procedure 
is mandate from the Article 223 of the labor code121. DOLE clearly expressed there is nothing 
they can do when the right of the procedure is regulated in the Philippine Law. It also implies 
that DOLE refuses to do any change of the current procedure and system and no more com-
ment in relation to the flaw of garnishment procedure was made.  
In the shipping industry, it is obvious that cost is one of the most predominant consid-
erations for shipowner to hire crew for their ships. When the “hidden cost122” of Filipino crew 
is continuing to put weight on the employers, there is a clear negative impact on the industry. 
                                                
 
121 Philippines Labor Code, Art. 223. Appeal. “Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and 
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of 
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5 Conclusion 
Based on the principle of interpretation, it is possible to argue that the Supreme Court is 
interpreting the contract in a wrong way by applying the Labor Code in deciding the outcome 
of disputes arising from POEA SEC. The terms of the contract are clear and precise enough, 
and  the Philippine law should only be applied in case of doubt. 
The basic policy of Labor Code is to protect labor, provide an equal working opportunity 
and regulate the relations between workers and employers123. Philippine Labour Code, Article 
4 states “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, 
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labour.” How-
ever, the Labor Code is not applicable to the POEA SEC. 
The POEA SEC is a standard contract negotiated by parties, and it is a contract  that 
“reflect the consensus of all stakeholders after a serious of tripartite consultations.”124 The 
right and obligation of both parties are governed by the terms and conditions stated in the con-
tract. Hence, it seems like the Supreme Court frequently cited the wrong sources of law to 
broad interpret the contract. 
The main purpose to set up organizations like NLRC and NCMB is to protect labors, 
the more vulnerable party in the employment relationship and to provide alternatives other 
than relying on the judicial body to settle disputes. However, cases in which labors, often per-
suade by layers to file petition, abuse the system have already brought employers great burden. 
Besides, the different criteria to the decision making among the arbitrator, NLRC/NCMB, 
court of appeal and the Supreme Court does not make the dispute settlement procedure easier. 
Furthermore, the decisions from the Supreme Court are not consistent, and thus, the complica-
tions within this whole system remain.  
As it could be seen from the decisions and the dispute settlement system, the disputes 
seem to be solved in favor of seafarers. This situation brings about a financial burden to ship-
                                                
 
123 Labor Code Article 3 Declaration of basic policy 
124 POEA Memorandum Circular No 10, dated October 26 2010, 
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owners and P&I clubs. Along with this, there is a manning problem associated with this issue, 
taking into account that the Filipino are the main workforce used in the shipping industry. 
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